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Book Review 
Emmanuel Alloa, Frank Chouraqui, and Rajiv Kaushik 
(eds.), Merleau-Ponty and Contemporary Philosophy 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2019) 
In their editorial introduction, Emmanuel Alloa, Frank Chouraqui, and 
Rajiv Kaushik set a mandate for this collected volume that may strike the 
reader as excessively ambitious: to demonstrate the relevance of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s work to contemporary philosophy across the themes of 
ontology, epistemology, anthropology, embodiment, animality, politics, 
language, aesthetics, and art. The fourteen chapters comprising the volume, 
accompanied by an epilogue from Jean-Luc Nancy, further aim to show both 
how Merleau-Ponty reconceptualized some of philosophy’s most enduring 
problems and to present the relevance of his work to interdisciplinary studies 
today.  
Merleau-Ponty and Contemporary Philosophy lives up to such a tall task. It 
provides a rich resource for Merleau-Ponty scholars who are interested in 
novel applications and understudied aspects of his thought. It also opens up 
Merleau-Ponty’s oeuvre to the general reader by presenting many possible 
entryways into the diversity of his work. The chapters of this volume are 
sectioned into to four major themes, namely, “Legacies,” “Mind and Nature,” 
“Politics, Power, and Institution,” and “Art and Aesthetics.” Given the 
thematic breadth of the volume, I will attend more closely to those chapters 
that I find most insightful or problematic.  
“Legacies,” the first section of the volume, initially situates Merleau-
Ponty’s in relation to classic philosophical concerns with embodiment, 
sensory experience, temporality, and language. In the first chapter “The Three 
Senses of Flesh: Concerning an Impasse in Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology,” 
Renaud Barbaras presents his account of Merleau-Ponty’s central notion of 
the flesh (la chair). Barbaras argues that there are three senses in which this 
should be comprehensively understood: the ontic flesh that is subject’s own 
sentient and self-sensing body (corps propre); the ontological flesh of the world 
(la chair du monde) that is sensible, but not self-sensing; and Barbaras’s own 
notion of transcendental flesh. The latter is meant to avoid a dualism and yet 
retain a clear distinction between the first two senses. For Barbaras asserts that 
the corps propre is part of the world but is nonetheless a distinct part because 
it intentionally constitutes the appearance of the world through desiring its 
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flesh. His argument is convincing, yet what is absent from Barnabas’s account 
is any consideration of what sense another sentient and self-sensing subject 
who is encountered in the world might have. This chapter is followed by 
“Vortex of Time: Merleau-Ponty in Temporality,” in which Bernhard 
Waldenfels and Regula Giuliani argue that “the central task of a 
phenomenology of time consists in grasping time in the flesh” (46). This 
means understanding time, following Merleau-Ponty, neither as a force or 
series of events that affect the subject from the outside nor as a purely 
subjective creation, but rather as a continual structuring of bodily behaviour 
in the world. These first two chapters are terminologically dense. As such, 
they are largely of interest to those who are well-acquainted with Merleau-
Ponty while being difficult to access for the general reader.  
By contrast, Emmanuel Alloa’s “Undergoing Experience: Sensing, Bodily 
Affordances, and the Institution of the Self” presents a refreshing shift in style, 
giving a clear and lucid answer to the question of how the relationship 
between the self and its sensory experiences should be theorized. Alloa, 
applying Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “institution,” argues that sensory 
experience should be understood as being instituted by the subject in the 
sense that sensations are actively given meaning by the subject rather than 
reaching them as discrete, preformed data from external objects. Sensory 
experience should also be understood as instituting the subject in the sense 
that undergoing an experience means actively and habitually responding to 
sensations and thereby being shaped by sensory experience. Alloa’s closing 
claim that “selves are just as transitive as experiences are” (80) is reminiscent 
of Buddhist analyses of sensory experience that arrive at a similar conclusion. 
Although Merleau-Ponty and Contemporary Philosophy deals only with 
contemporary Western philosophy, this point indicates that the work of 
Merleau-Ponty has relevance for contemporary cross-cultural philosophy as 
well. “Legacies” is concluded with Stephen Watson’s chapter on the 
relationship between sense and nonsense in terms of the relationship between 
consciousness and language.  
The next section, “Mind and Nature,” addresses the relationship between 
the human subject and the natural world. This is perhaps the most engaging 
section of the volume, since the reader is presented with three distinct 
applications of Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on nature. In his chapter, “The 
Truth of Naturalism,” Jocelyn Benoist puts forward the argument that 
without reducing intentionality to nonintentional nature, Merleau-Ponty is 
able to situate intentionality within the natural world by recognising that 
intentionality is fundamentally embodied. Benoist concludes with the view 
that our concept of nature “should always remain resistant to full-blooded 
mindedness” (117) but leaves open the question of whether perception should 
be excluded from it. Jennifer McWeeny takes up this question in “The 
Panpsychism Question in Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology.” McWeeny asserts that 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontological notion of the flesh entails panpsychism, that is, 
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in the sense of a mind-like quality being present throughout the world. 
McWeeny considers Merleau-Ponty’s notion that the body is made of the 
same flesh as the world to mean that if my body is sentient and self-sensing, 
then the whole world must be also. McWeeny’s argument is, however, 
generally difficult to accept since she insists on an all or nothing approach to 
the question of sentience, rather than elaborating on whether there may be a 
spectrum of sentience in the world. This chapter is followed by a far more 
measured approach to the question of subjective meaning in living beings. 
Annabelle Dufourcq compellingly argues for the importance of Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy for the field of biosemiotics. The aim here is to show that 
the behaviors and appearances of animals are not reducible to the rigid, 
predefined functionality that a positivistic approach maintains. Instead, they 
should be understood as symbolic, i.e., as being creatively instituted in 
response to the perception of other livings beings and as having ambiguous 
meaning in an intersubjective field that requires imaginative interpretation.  
The section “Politics, Power, Institution” begins with Bernard Flynn’s 
chapter, “The Institution of the Law: Merleau-Ponty and Lefort.” Flynn is of 
the opinion that one can uphold the normativity of the law without appeal to 
any supersensible, transcendent foundation for it. This requires 
understanding the law according to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the institution. 
The law must be understood both as being historically instituted by the 
activity of political subjects and as instituting them as political subjects. Flynn 
further contends “that the institution of the law is prior to the existence of 
human beings” (179) and that it has an evolutionary precedent in social 
organisations in the animal kingdom. Flynn concludes that the normative 
character of the law is justified with reference to this evolutionary institution. 
He adds, without any explanation, that we should elaborate a politics that is 
“able to exercise coercive power” (181) with the goal of human flourishing. 
Yet the basis of this contention is unoriginal and its conclusion problematic. 
Peter Kropotkin, the classic anarchist thinker, already argued in his 1902 work 
Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution that social organization is prior to the 
existence of human beings, and extensively demonstrated that the coercive 
power exercised by the human institution of law is detrimental to human 
flourishing. Flynn, however, makes no mention of Kropotkin or anarchism, 
except when ambiguously stating that Pauline Christianity could be a form of 
anarchism given its indifference or hostility to the law and politics in general. 
Yet in Kropotkin’s anarchism one can find an affirmative and normative view 
of politics as an evolutionary institution.  
The next chapter by Frank Chouraqui presents a novel approach to the 
problem of post-truth politics. Chouraqui explains that Merleau-Ponty’s 
critique of cognitivism as well as his notions of recognition, institution, and 
power can render comprehensible the widespread adherence to and impact 
of non-credible political narratives. Political power and narratives are 
instituted as credible only because they are recognized as such, not because 
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they are cognitively grounded in truth that is independent of the subjects who 
recognize it. Having been thus instituted, they are recognized as credible in a 
circular fashion. Unfortunately, after setting up a strong framework, 
Chouraqui does not apply it to any concrete instances of post-truth politics. 
The section is concluded with the highlight of the volume; Sara Ahmed’s 
“Institutional Habits: About Bodies and Orientations that Don’t Fit.” Here, 
Ahmed uses Merleau-Ponty’s model of the habitual body to account for how 
bodies inhabit institutional spaces, are habituated by them, and how certain 
bodies are implicitly instituted as those that “fit right.” Ahmed explains that 
institutional norms are somatic norms, arguing in the context of institutional 
racism that the white body is habitually assumed as the right fit in most 
institutional spaces even if that space is explicitly open to all bodies. This 
means that white bodies comfortably and unwittingly inhabit institutional 
spaces that fit their habits, while other bodies are forced to conform or 
otherwise stick out like a sore thumb. In this face of this problem, Ahmed 
presents a compelling account for diversity work as a phenomenologically 
oriented task of changing institutional habits.  
In the final chapters of the volume, belonging to the section “Art and 
Creation,” Galen A. Johnson takes the framework of Merleau-Ponty’s 
aesthetics to the theme of art and politics, arguing that if politics is a realm of 
appearances and a linguistic field then a commitment to aesthetic sensibility 
and open dialogue derived from Andre Breton’s conception of “mad love” is 
required. Mauro Carbone further contributes a much-needed engagement 
with Merleau-Ponty’s understudied reflections on cinema as a kind of “a-
philosophy.” In connection with Gilles Deleuze’s reflections on cinema, 
Carbone explicates the potential of cinema as a style of thought and 
expression that is eminently concerned with the visible, like phenomenology, 
and yet is free of the abstract conceptualizations of formal philosophy. 
Veronique M. Fóti’s “Strong Beauty: In Face of Structures of Exclusion” 
grapples with the question of what kind of beauty is resistant to being 
appropriated for the purposes of political domination. Fóti’s answer is 
“strong beauty”: art that articulates a meaningful form while simultaneously 
acknowledging what exceeds it and cannot be appropriated and dominated. 
Unfortunately, these chapters are made up primarily of dense, intertextual 
references that blur their lines of argument. The notable chapter of this 
section, however, is Rajiv Kaushik’s critique of the museum. Kaushik argues 
that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “institution”—which has proven in many 
chapters to be one of Merleau-Ponty’s most prodigious concepts—“undercuts 
the very notion of a museum as an institute” (256). This is because museums 
typically display an ignorance of the ambiguity, contingency, and plurality of 
meanings that an artwork is capable of as it shapes our way of seeing. Instead, 
museums treat artworks as fixed objects that do not affect our vision and 
present them according a rigid art history. Kaushik calls instead for an anti-
hegemonic museology that puts art “on display from the perspective of their 
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execution” (262) and orientates the museum around the relational institution 
of meaning that occurs between art and observer.  
The volume is concluded with an epilogue provided by Jean-Luc Nancy 
who very briefly reflects on whether his work bears any notable relation to 
that of Merleau-Ponty. While Nancy provides an interesting explanation for 
including an epigraph from Merleau-Ponty in his forthcoming publication 
The Deconstruction of Sex, this epilogue is rather awkwardly tacked on to the 
end of the volume. It consists of several points of interest in Merleau-Ponty’s 
work for Nancy, but doesn’t contribute much to the volume except for an 
intriguing connection with a significant contemporary philosopher.  
Each thematic section of Merleau-Ponty and Contemporary Philosophy could 
be the subject of a separate volume itself, and perhaps would then have 
respectively benefited from a more cohesive treatment. But their inclusion in 
a single volume undoubtedly presents a forceful display of the wide-ranging 
relevance of Merleau-Ponty’s work to contemporary philosophy and the 
range of possibilities that are open to further research.  
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